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Gaze represents a major non-verbal communication channel in social interactions. In this
respect, when facing another person, one’s gaze should not be examined as a purely
perceptive process but also as an action-perception online performance. However, little
is known about processes involved in the real-time self-regulation of social gaze. The
present study investigates the impact of a gaze-contingent viewing window on fixation
patterns and the awareness of being the agent moving the window. In face-to-face
scenarios played by a virtual human character, the task for the 18 adult participants was to
interpret an equivocal sentence which could be disambiguated by examining the emotional
expressions of the character speaking. The virtual character was embedded in naturalistic
backgrounds to enhance realism. Eye-tracking data showed that the viewing window
induced changes in gaze behavior, notably longer visual fixations. Notwithstanding, only
half of the participants ascribed the window displacements to their eye movements.
These participants also spent more time looking at the eyes and mouth regions of the
virtual human character. The outcomes of the study highlight the dissociation between
non-volitional gaze adaptation and the self-ascription of agency. Such dissociation provides
support for a two-step account of the sense of agency composed of pre-noetic monitoring
mechanisms and reflexive processes, linked by bottom-up and top-down processes. We
comment upon these results, which illustrate the relevance of our method for studying
online social cognition, in particular concerning autism spectrum disorders (ASD) where
the poor pragmatic understanding of oral speech is considered linked to visual peculiarities
that impede facial exploration.
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INTRODUCTION
When looking at someone else’s face, we tend to scan preferen-
tially and consistently the eye and mouth regions (Mertens et al.,
1993) although we are not aware of doing so. Nevertheless, two
limiting factors interfere with our automatic tendency to stare at
one another’s eyes: cultural rules and individual differences in
emotional sensitivity to eye-contact. When engaged in conver-
sations with others, visual behavior conforms to implicit social
display rules requiring fast and subtle adjustments. For instance,
making frequent eye-contact can be experienced by the respon-
der as threatening or intrusive and increases her/his emotional
state (Senju and Johnson, 2009). This leads interacting partners
in many cultures not to stare too long at each other, or even, as in
theWolof tradition, not to look at all at the partner while speaking
(Meyer and Girke, 2011). Whether a face-to-face interaction feels
comfortable thus depends on how each partaker self-monitors
her/his gaze. While acknowledging the socio-cultural determi-
nants that regulate eye movements, the variety of individual
differences in the attention to the other’s gaze within the nor-
mal population should be noted (Frischen et al., 2007). Frischen
et al. (2007) suggest that the acute emotional response triggered
by the eye-gaze of others could lead some individuals to learn to
avoid looking directly at the eye region of others, thus developing
a voluntary control of gaze processing. In this respect, individual
differences are interpreted as stemming from the degree of con-
trol an individual exerts over her/his reflex of following another
person’s gaze (Bayliss et al., 2005) and consequently over her/his
general gazing at eyes behavior. Strikingly, although we modu-
late our gaze according to social rules and our own sensitivity to
eye-contact, we are usually unaware of controlling it.
This dissociation between control and awareness of control
of our ocular movements is an issue that has been largely over-
looked until now, despite being a part of the general question
regarding the self-monitoring and awareness of action. Blakemore
et al. (2002) suggested that parts of the motor system could func-
tion in the absence of awareness, especially the motor commands
responsible for predicting the fine trajectory adjustment param-
eters of a movement. They mention as an example the study of
Goodale et al. (1994) showing that the displacement of a target
during a saccade remained unnoticed by participants although
they adjusted their hand to its new position (Goodale et al.,
1994). In contrast, “forward models,” which are conceived as
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internal neural processes predicting the sensory consequences of a
movement based on an efference copy of motor signals, are con-
sidered instrumental in bringing about the awareness of action
(Wolpert et al., 1995; Wolpert and Miall, 1996; Blakemore et al.,
2002). Accordingly, forward models come into play most notably
when the intentions and goals are clearly stated or in the case of
a clear-cut mismatch between sensory prediction and feedback
(Slachevsky et al., 2001).
Evidence supports the existence of forward models and effer-
ence copies of eye motor signals. For instance, the perceptual
invariance of the world despite the visual flow induced by the eye
movements on the retina is classically explained by a neuronal
mechanism that compensates for the retinal image displacement,
by predicting the visual consequences of the eye movements on
the basis of an efference copy (Holst and Mittelstaedt, 1950;
Sperry, 1950). As postulated by the forward model hypothesis,
some visual neurons in the macaque brain have been shown
to predict the visual consequences of a saccade by remapping
their receptive field before the saccade so that it accounts for
the shift in space caused by the saccade (Colby and Goldberg,
1999). This remapping process is coupled with an efference copy,
also called the corollary discharge, which runs along a neural
pathway that has been at least partly identified (Wurtz, 2008).
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) lends support for
the existence of similar visual remapping neuronal activity in the
human brain (Merriam et al., 2003, 2007). Emerging evidence
indicates that this predictive mechanism could mainly sub-serve
visuomotor control (Bays and Husain, 2007).
Whether and in which circumstances visuomotor control may
be subject to awareness are questions that could be addressed
in the light of the multifactorial two-step model of agency pro-
posed by Synofzik et al. (2008). Indeed, this model posits two
levels that would function with relative independence, namely the
feeling of agency and the judgment of agency. As in the classi-
cal comparator model (Blakemore et al., 1998), they describe the
feeling of agency as stemming from a low-level pre-conceptual
mechanism that monitors motor outputs and sensory inputs. Yet,
such feeling is not sufficient alone to ascribe self-agency. Many
examples driven from de-afferented patients (Fourneret et al.,
2002) or parietal lobe damaged patients (Sirigu et al., 1999) con-
verge in showing that an efference copy cannot explain on its
own how we decide about agency attribution. Rather, Synofzik
et al. (2008) reason that the judgment of agency results from the
congruency between intention and effects, independently from
any comparator output. They propose to conceive the judgment
of agency as a high-level interpretative process that attempts to
find the best plausible cause for an action based on contextual
information and personal beliefs. Several recent studies provide
support to this perspective. For instance, Spengler et al. (2009)
have demonstrated that participants, who were trained to expect
a given consequence for their action, subsequently experience an
increased sense of agency in case of congruence between their
experimentally induced expectation and the actual consequence
of their action. Voss and colleagues (Voss et al., 2010) argue
that the combination of reduced prediction and excessive self-
agency attribution observed in schizophrenia cannot be explained
by the comparator model. They distinguish between a predictive
and a retrospective mechanism of agency attribution, showing an
exaggerated reliance on retrospection in schizophrenic patients
who associate their actions with unrelated external events, while
typical adults rely on probabilistic estimations for binding their
actions with corresponding effects.
The present study aimed at investigating the relationship
between the self-monitoring of gaze and judgment of agency
using a newly developed method and experimental platform
with expressive virtual characters and real-time gaze-contingent
technology based on a viewing window. Baugh and Marotta
(2007) advocate using the viewing window paradigm to examine
the interactions between perception and action. In this classi-
cal paradigm (McConkie and Rayner, 1975), participants are
presented with a degraded visual stimulus on which they can con-
trol an area with normal clarity (the viewing window). Similar
limited-viewing paradigms have previously been exploited to
examine the visual exploration of faces in disorders affecting
social cognition (Spezio et al., 2007). In our experiment, the entire
display was blurred except for a gaze-contingent moving win-
dow. The viewing window was meant to stimulate the ascription
of self-agency along a bottom-up pathway starting from simple
action-perception coupling. To favor bottom-up processes, the
experimental task required participants to be naïve about the pur-
pose of the viewing window. Consequently, the participants were
left uninformed about the viewing window’s functioning and we
chose to evaluate their judgment of agency using an open ques-
tion asked at the end of the experiment. Although methods for
disentangling the feeling and judgment of agency often employ
instructions asking participants to rate agency on a scale (Kühn
et al., 2011), our evaluation method differed in that we sought to
measure the emergence of awareness. Therefore, we opted for an
interviewing technique that left the participants uninformed of
the matter under scrutiny, as implemented in previous studies of
agency (Nielsen, 1963; Jeannerod, 2003).
We examined the effects of the window on fixation patterns
in order to assess the self-monitoring of gaze and recorded the
participants’ answers about what controlled the window to assess
their judgment of agency. Although the method used here for
examining agency could also be relevant for non-social stimuli,
the focus of interest in the present study specifically addresses
online face-to-face interaction that involves high-order gaze con-
trol guided by social considerations. We employed stimuli depict-
ing animated virtual characters rather than real actors to have
precise control over the design of their facial expressions, the into-
nation of their voice and the synchrony between speech and facial
movements. Finally, we sought to enhance the ecological validity
of the experimental apparatus by creating virtual characters with
realistic physical human features and embedding them in videos
of real-life everyday environments.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Eighteen adolescents and adults participated in the experiment.
They were free of any known psychiatric or neurologic symp-
toms, non-corrected visual or auditory deficits and recent use of
any substance that could impede concentration. Their age ranged
from 17 to 40 years with a mean of 28.5 (SD = 6.74). There
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were 10 males and eight females. This research was reviewed
and approved by the regional ethics committee of Tours, France.
Informed consent was obtained from each participant.
MATERIALS
Participants were seated in front of a computer screen located
above an eye-tracker (model D6-HS from Applied Science
Laboratories with a sampling rate of 50Hz) that remotely
detected their eye orientation, without constraining their head
movements or requiring them to wear a helmet. The graphic dis-
play was gaze-contingent in that it was entirely blurred, except for
an area centered around the current focal point of the participant
(Figure 1). The apparatus thus simulated a gaze-controlled view-
ing window, providing real-time visual feedback on the location
of the user’s gaze. Participants were placed approximately 57 cm
away from the screen. The screen’s size was 19 inches (377 ×
302mm2) with a resolution of 1280 × 1024 pixels (approximately
37◦ × 30◦ in visual angles). The viewing window was a rectan-
gle with rounded angles measuring 233 × 106 pixels (approxi-
mately 7◦ × 3◦ in visual angles, thus encompassing fovea vision).
The latency of the gaze-contingent display was of approximately
100ms between the eye orientation detection and the reposition-
ing of the viewing window. This delay was expected to induce a
behavior whereby participants would stabilize their gaze to stay
in sync with the viewing window. The gaze-contingency could be
switched on or off. In the latter, the eye-tracker would still record
the direction of the gaze.
The task presented to the participants was designed to simulate
a face-to-face situation involving verbal and non-verbal commu-
nication. In each trial, a virtual character told the participants
about a recent experience she/he was involved in. Acknowledging
the current limitations of technology in creating believable inter-
actions with virtual humans (Groom et al., 2009), the trials were
short (less than 25 s) andmerely simulated the beginning phase of
a social encounter occurring before the participant’s turn to talk.
The verbal message of the virtual character included an equivocal
sentence that implicitly required looking at the facial expres-
sions of the virtual character. For instance, the virtual character
would say, “I’m so lucky” while displaying a sad facial expression.
FIGURE 1 | The gaze-controlled viewing window: the graphic display is
entirely blurred except for an area centered on the focal point of the
participant, which is detected in real-time using an eye-tracker.
The participants had to answer two close-choice questions that
assessed their attention to the facial expressions. The first ques-
tion was about the character’s feelings and the second was about
what caused those feelings. There were three possible choices for
each question: the correct interpretation; an interpretation coher-
ent with the equivocal sentence left alone, but incoherent with the
facial expressions; an interpretation incoherent with both the ver-
bal utterances and facial expressions. Table 1 provides an example
illustrating the task.
The gaze-contingent viewing window was large enough to see
the virtual character’s two eyes with eyebrows, or the virtual
character’s mouth (Figure 1), which are both highly expressive
facial features (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). A male and a female
character were designed with Poser Pro software (Smith Micro
Software, Inc.), which enables creating highly realistic virtual
humans with animated facial expressions that include creases in
the skin. The male and female characters each appeared in half
of the trial. They kept gazing at the user throughout the anima-
tion. Facial expressions associated with the equivocal sentences
were chosen among five basic emotions (disgust, joy, fear, anger,
and sadness), which were designed using Ekman’s specifications
(Ekman and Friesen, 1975). The synchronization of dynamic
facial expressions with speech had been studied in a preliminary
experiment that included 23 participants (Buisine et al., 2010).
Based on its outcomes in terms of recognition performances and
perceived realism, we adjusted the facial movements associated
with each utterance so that the facial expression would unfold
during the entire duration of the utterance and be maintained for
1 sec after the utterance. The participants were to rely predom-
inantly on the facial expressions; thus the characters’ emotional
intonation was minimized by using synthesized speech, created
with Virtual Speaker software version 2.2 for French, from the
Table 1 | Example of an animation presented to the participants.
Animated scene’s script
(the virtual character is named John)
Utterance Facial expression
I was waiting for the bus with Sandra Joy
But, Franck passed by just at that moment Surprise
He offered to drive her back home Sadness
How nice of him! Anger
CHOICE OF ANSWERS FOR THE FIRST QUESTION, I.E.,
“HOW DOES JOHN FEEL?”
He is jealous
He is anxious
He is happy
CHOICE OF ANSWERS FOR THE SECOND QUESTION, I.E.,
“HOW DO YOU KNOW THAT?”
Instead of John, Franck gets to be with Sandra on the way back home.
It was nice of Franck to offer to drive Sandra back home.
Franck is a poor driver and often has accidents.
The upper part of the table presents each utterance of the virtual character
associated with its simultaneous facial expression. The key sentence inducing
ambiguity is in italic font. The possible choices for the two subsequent questions
are shown beneath. The correct answers are in italic font.
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Acapela Group Company (www.acapela-group.com). Using vir-
tual characters rather than real actors enabled matching the usage
of synthesized speech. The virtual characters’ lip movements were
synchronized with their speech using Poser Pro software. The vir-
tual characters were embedded in videos of real life settings that
provided a naturalistic context.
PROCEDURE
The study utilized an ABA design: in the baseline condition,
the graphic display was entirely clear; during the experimental
condition that followed, the entire display was blurred, and the
gaze-controlled viewing window was set on; in the final condi-
tion, the gaze-contingent viewing window was set off, and the
entire graphic display became clear again. The participants had to
perform the same task in all three conditions. There were 20 tri-
als per condition, which totaled 60 different animated scenes. The
animated scenes lasted 18 s on average, ranging from 13 to 24 s.
The order of the scenes and the condition in which they appeared
were randomly counterbalanced across the participants and com-
plied with the constraint that the total duration of the scenes had
to be the same in every condition. The experimentation started
with a standard calibrating procedure for the eye-tracker. In a
first demo animation, both virtual characters introduced them-
selves and provided the instructions for the task. Just before
the experimental condition, a written instruction appeared on the
screen that explicitly encouraged the participants to look at the
facial expressions (“Think about looking at the characters’ faces
to understand what they feel”). The purpose of this instruction
was to prepare the participants for the gaze-contingent display
and exhort them to behave consistently even though their vision
would be constrained. The experimental and final baseline con-
ditions also started with a short demo animation showing both
virtual characters cheering the participant. The purpose was to
give some time for the participants to adapt to the new condition
and reward their efforts for continuing the experiment.
The participants were told before they started the experi-
ment that some parts of the visual display would sometimes
remain clear, whereas others would be blurred. Yet, they were left
uninformed about the fact that the display was gaze-contingent,
although they knew that their gaze was being continuously mea-
sured by the eye-tracker. At the end of the experiment, they were
asked a question to examine whether they had noticed that they
were controlling the viewing window. This question translates
into English as the following: “You noticed that in some videos,
there were blurred areas and clear areas. What causes the clear
areas?” Their answers were recorded and analyzed by two inde-
pendent judges, as either showing awareness or not. The kappa
computation showed a complete agreement between the judges.
DATA ANALYZES
The software we developed automatically recorded eye-tracking
data, the scores on the task and the response time. Given that
there were 20 scenes in each condition, each of the two closed-
choice questions following the animated scenes yielded scores
ranging from 0 to 20. Fixations were detected, using a propri-
etary algorithm of Applied Science Laboratories (the provider of
the eye-tracker), on the basis of a cluster of Point-Of-Gaze (POG)
that remained in 1◦ of visual angle for at least 100ms. The number
of POGs collected during a fixation provides a measure of the fix-
ation’s duration, which is equal to the duration in seconds divided
by the sampling rate. We analyzed the gaze data with a soft-
ware prototype, developed for the present research, which could
handle eye-tracking data on dynamic visual displays. It enabled
the aggregation of gaze data on pre-defined rectangular Areas of
Interest (AOI). We defined two sets of AOI: first, an AOI that was
circumscribed around the head (Figure 2A) of the virtual charac-
ters and another AOI, named “no-face,” which encompassed the
rest of the screen; second, an “eyes” AOI that surrounded the eye
region and included the eyebrows, and another AOI with the same
dimensions for the mouth (Figure 2B).
Analyzes were performed with the Statistical Analysis Software
(SAS www.sas.com). Our hypothesis stated that the gaze would
stabilize in the experimental condition. In other words, the num-
ber of fixations would decrease, the average duration of fixations
would increase and the average distance between two consecu-
tive fixations would decrease. As the experimental design involved
repeated measures, we conducted analyses of variance (ANOVA)
for these variables using a mixed-design with an unstructured
residual covariance matrix. The within-subjects factor was the
condition. We also used the bimodal variable derived from the
last question of the experiment as an adjustment factor that
accounted for the awareness of controlling the viewing window.
FIGURE 2 | The rectangular Area-of-Interest (AOI) used for analyzing gaze fixations. The circles represent consecutive fixations that are linked by the
visual path. (A) the “face” AOI used; (B) the “eyes” and “mouth” AOI.
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This bimodal variable divided the participants into two groups:
those who gained awareness and those who did not. Post hoc
t-tests were performed using the Tukey adjustment procedure;
the p-values provided hereunder are adjusted values. We also
calculated the corresponding effect sizes, using the commonly
accepted threshold fixed at 0.2, 0.5, and 0.8 for small, medium,
and large magnitudes, respectively (Zakzanis, 2001). We checked
for possible influences of age and gender on the answers given to
the last question by performing a t-test for age and the Fisher’s
exact test for gender. To verify that compliance with the task was
comparable across conditions, we analyzed the participants’ per-
formances based on their scores, response time, and total fixation
time on faces. We first checked for possible influences of age and
gender on these variables during the baseline condition, using
Pearson correlation coefficients for age and the t-test (female ver-
sus male) for gender. The scores and response time were then
processed with the same ANOVA as before. The total fixation
time (i.e., the sum of fixation durations) was analyzed using an
additional “face/no-face” (“face” AOI vs. “no-face” AOI) within-
subject factor. We did not expect the experimental condition to
impair the participants’ gazing strategies, and thus we assumed
that there would not be a condition × face/no face interaction in
this analysis. Finally, we sought to investigate whether the view-
ing window would influence the visual scanning of the eyes and
mouth regions. We thus performed a second ANOVA on the total
fixation time using the within-subject factors that follow: the
condition, the answer to the last question and an “eyes-mouth”
bimodal variable with two modalities: the “eyes” AOI versus the
“mouth” AOI.
RESULTS
The answers to the question “What causes the clear areas?”
revealed that 9 out of 18 participants noticed that their gaze was
responsible for the movements of the viewing window. The other
nine participants showed no such awareness. These two groups of
participants did not differ significantly in age or gender. Three
participants of the latter group acknowledged they were look-
ing at the clear areas, despite not noticing that they controlled
them. Three other participants judged that the clear areas were
purposely placed on the face by the computer.
The ANOVA showed a significant effect of condition for
every dependent variable employed to assess gaze stabiliza-
tion (Table 2). The number of fixations was significantly
lower in the experimental condition compared to the base-
line [t(16) = 4.27; p = 0.0016; d = 1.20] and final conditions
[t(16) = 4.14; p = 0.0021; d = 1.05]. The average duration of
fixations was significantly higher in the experimental condition
compared to the baseline [t(16) = 3.86; p = 0.0037; d = 1.08]
and final conditions [t(16) = 3.77; p = 0.0045; d = 1.00]. The
average distance between consecutive fixations decreased signif-
icantly during the experimental condition compared to the base-
line [t(16) = 3.91; p = 0.0034; d = 0.91], and final conditions,
[t(16) = 2.85; p = 0.0297; d = 0.59].
Performance variables (scores, response time, total fixation
time on faces) were not significantly correlated with age, and
the t-tests comparing female and male did not yield significant
differences. Main effects of the condition were also found for
each of these variables (Table 2). The scores were significantly
higher in the final condition compared to the baseline for both
questions, [first question: t(16) = 3.69; p = 0.0053; d = 0.81;
second question: t(16) = 3.79; p = 0.0044; d = 0.83]. The scores
in the experimental condition were significantly lower than in the
final condition for the first question [t(16) = 2.87; p = 0.0284;
d = 0.81]. The response times for the first question were
significantly longer during the baseline condition than during
the experimental condition [t(16) = 2.68; p = 0.041; d = 0.57]
and final condition, [t(16) = 4.93; p = 0.0004; d = 1.15]. They
also decreased from the experimental to the final condition
[t(16) = 3.13; p = 0.0168; d = 0.47]. Although a main effect of
the condition was observed regarding response times for the sec-
ond question, post hoc t-tests did not reveal any significant effect.
The analysis of the total fixation time using the “face/no-face” fac-
tor showed that this variable decreased between the experimental
condition and the final condition, although the effect size was
small, [t(16) = 6.32; p < 0.0001; d = 0.16]. There was an effect
of the “face/no-face” factor [F(1, 16) = 134.97; p < 0.0001],
which showed that the participants watched the “face” AOI for
a longer period (Least Square M = 612 SE = 50) than the “no-
face” AOI (Least Square M = 51 SE = 9). The condition ×
“face/no-face” interaction was not significant.
Table 2 | Means and standard deviations of dependant variables in the three sequential conditions.
Condition
Baseline Experimental Final F (2, 16) p
Number of fixations 32 (9) 22 (7) 30 (8) 9.30∗∗ 0.0021
Average duration of fixations (in number of POGa) 22 (8) 36 (17) 23 (8) 7.48∗∗ 0.0051
Average distance between consecutive fixations (in pixels) 1204 (399) 938 (269) 1094 (266) 7.86∗∗ 0.0042
Total fixation time (in number of POGa) 338 (314) 342 (345) 324 (317) 20.65∗∗∗ <0.0001
First question scores 16.8 (2.9) 17.3 (2.0) 18.6 (1.3) 10.26∗∗ 0.0014
Second question scores 16.2 (3.1) 17.1 (2.2) 18.2 (1.8) 12.16∗∗∗ 0.0006
Response time for the first question (in milliseconds) 6964 (2196) 5725 (2220) 4886 (1521) 14.74∗∗∗ 0.0002
Response time for the second question (in milliseconds) 9387 (8857) 6493 (1849) 6351 (2293) 6.09∗ 0.0108
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
aPOG: Point-of-Gaze at a sample rate of 50Hz.
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Note should be taken that in none of the above analyses
did we observe an interaction between the condition and the
answer to the last question. In particular, the variables used
to measure gaze stabilization yielded the following interaction
statistics: F(2, 16) = 0.65 p = 0.5352 for the number of fixa-
tions; F(2, 16) = 0.26; p = 0.7777 for the average duration of
fixations; F(2, 16) = 1.23; p = 0.3179 for the average distance
between consecutive fixations. The effect of the condition thus
remained unchanged whether or not the participants noticed
that their gaze controlled the viewing window. The ANOVA on
the total fixation time using the “eyes-mouth” factor did, how-
ever, yield a significant interaction between the condition and the
answer to the last question [F(2, 16) = 3.74; p = 0.0466]. Post
hoc t-tests revealed that participants who showed an awareness of
controlling the viewing windowwere those for whom the total fix-
ation time increased between the baseline condition (Least Square
M = 145 SE = 37) and the experimental condition (Least Square
M = 238 SE = 37).
DISCUSSION
The study presented here explores human abilities to monitor and
gain awareness of self-generated gaze movements in social con-
texts. The results show that visual biofeedback of eye movements
can be used to monitor one’s own gaze behavior, even without
the self-ascription of agency. The analyzes of eye-tracking vari-
ables converge in showing that when the gaze-controlled viewing
windowwas set on, the number of fixations decreased, the average
duration of fixations increased, and the average distance between
consecutive fixations decreased. In other words, the gaze was sta-
bilized in the experimental condition. Themedium-to-large effect
sizes of these variations signal important changes in gaze behav-
ior. Notwithstanding, the analyses indicate that this stabilization
of gaze was independent from the declared self-ascription of the
viewing window’s movements. As expected, the results showed
that the participants focused predominantly on the face of the vir-
tual characters and that the gaze-controlled viewing window did
not impair their compliance with the task. Consistently, the scores
and response times did not show an increase or decrease specific
to the experimental condition; but rather, they indicated that the
performances improved over time.
Although the participants adapted their gaze behavior to the
viewing window feedback, only half of them realized that they
were controlling it. Literature echoes this incomplete awareness
of one’s own gaze behavior. For instance, experiments on anti-
saccade tasks, where the participants are instructed to glance in
the opposite direction of an impending cue, reveal that partici-
pants are unaware of half of their errors (Hutton, 2008). Poletti
et al. (2010) have reported an experiment using eye-tracking
where, paradoxically, the participants accurately tracked amoving
dot, which they reported to be stationary and accurately fix-
ated a stationary dot, which they reported to be moving. Hsiao
and Cottrell (2008) incidentally observed that participants were
not aware that the display used in their experiment was gaze-
contingent. Noteworthy, several participants in our experiment
explicitly declared that they were looking at the clear areas during
the experimental condition and still failed to take responsibil-
ity for the appearance of these areas, attributing them instead to
the computer. These participants seem to have operated a time
reversal between their action and the ensuing visual sensation, as
reported in experiments on motor-sensory recalibration (Stetson
et al., 2006).
A pending issue pertains to the fact that the last question
regarding awareness divided the group into two equal halves. A
possible explanation for this dichotomy involves the fact that the
feedback latency of the viewing window could represent a thresh-
old for awareness. This interpretation is based on an analogy with
Nielsen’s paradigm (Nielsen, 1963) that has been extensively used
to investigate the sense of agency (Jeannerod, 2003). In this exper-
imental paradigm, the participants are asked to draw a straight
line without having their own hand in sight. They are simul-
taneously presented with a visual feedback of their trajectory,
in which, unbeknownst to them, a deviation is introduced. The
participants automatically adjust their hand movement to com-
pensate for the deviation. Yet, they become aware of the conflict
only when the deviation exceeds a particular threshold angle,
which is common to all healthy adults (Slachevsky et al., 2001).
Similarly, we suspect the 100ms latency between the movements
of the eye and the repositioning of the viewing window to rep-
resent such a threshold for awareness. The feedback provided
in our experiment could have yielded an ambiguous experience
of agency. Such an ambiguous experience is likely to disrupt
the capacity to adequately distinguish between externally ver-
sus internally produced actions, as suggested by Moore et al.
(2010). It should be noted that external causation attribution
involves different brain mechanisms than those involved in the
self-attribution of agency (Sperduti et al., 2011).
The dissociation found in the present study between the effec-
tive changes in gaze behavior induced by the gaze-contingent
viewing window and failures in the judgment of agency argues
in favor of the two-step account of agency proposed by Synofzik
et al. (2008). Conceivably, these two levels may function with rel-
ative independence in the case of gaze behaviors, at least in the
social context that was tested here. Nonetheless, the outcomes of
the present study do not rule out possible bottom-up processes
that influence awareness and originate from sensorimotor signals,
as supported by Kühn et al. (2011). They do, however, support the
existence of a top-down pathway demonstrated by the fact that
the participants who gained awareness of controlling the view-
ing window modified their gazing strategy. Indeed, contrasting
with the unaware participants, these participants focused more
on the eyes and mouth regions when the gaze-contingent view-
ing window was set on, thus enforcing a usually spontaneous
visual scanning behavior that is specifically relevant to social
interactions. Based on this observation, if the participants gain
an awareness of controlling the viewing window, either on their
own or because they were told so, our setup should drive them to
pay more attention to the emotionally meaningful facial features.
Overall, these outcomes support the propensity of human
beings to monitor and adapt to the visual consequences of their
own gaze, as evidenced here using social face-to-face stimuli.
Although we acknowledge that gaze stabilization induced by the
viewing window could also occur with non-social stimuli (an
issue that we plan to investigate in a separate experiment), the
self-monitoring of gaze appears particularly relevant for social
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interactions due to the eyes’ active role in human communica-
tion (Emery, 2000; Frischen et al., 2007). Indeed, eye-contact
plays an important role in social intercourse and is known to
influence social cognitive processes, such as gender discrimina-
tion (Macrae et al., 2002), facial recognition (Hood et al., 2003),
and visual search for faces (Senju et al., 2008). The present project
raises issues that are relevant for a line of research that studies
gaze not only as an unidirectional channel enabling the trans-
mission of emotional information from one person to another,
but also as a bi-directional channel where interaction is possible
(Redcay et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 2010; Wilms et al., 2010;
Pfeiffer et al., 2011). Our study adds on previous knowledge by
showing that self-monitoring can function relatively indepen-
dently from the judgment of agency in the case of gaze. Such
a finding questions the role of awareness in social gaze as it
suggests that at least some gazing behaviors could occur with
an inadequate judgment of agency. Two tentative explanations
not mutually exclusive can be speculated. First, the swiftness of
gaze could be inappropriate for the time scale of conscious pro-
cessing in the context of social face-to-face interactions. Second,
an explicit consciousness of what originates from the self and
what does not, may be less critical for the “language of the
eyes” than for other communication channels such as verbal
language.
This study raises several questions that require further investi-
gation. First, as mentioned earlier, the neural substrates respon-
sible for the self-monitoring of gaze are still unknown, although
potential candidates have been identified. Second, the latency of
the visual feedback could have a determining influence on the
sense of agency and needs to be more precisely examined. Third,
the present study focused on social gaze and the experimental
material was exclusively based on social stimuli. In the future,
we plan to conduct a similar experiment using non-social stim-
uli to verify whether the findings are specific to social contexts.
The outcomes of the new methodological approach presented
here seem relevant for a range of different scientific domains. For
instance, in the field of computer sciences, researchers working
on gaze-contingent graphic displays should take into account the
fact that gaze-controlled visual feedback can induce behaviors,
which the user may not necessarily be aware of. Our research also
highlights issues pertaining to social gaze control, which could
prove particularly informative in psychopathology. Indeed, pecu-
liar patterns of gaze behavior in social context are frequently
associated with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) (Klin et al.,
2002; Noris et al., 2011) and gaze control impairments have been
demonstrated in schizophrenia and affective disorders (Lencer
et al., 2010). Interesting experimental designs for these popu-
lations could be derived from the fact that normal participants
who were aware of controlling the viewing window tended to
focus more on the eyes and mouth (Grynszpan et al., 2011).
Using the experimental method and platform described here, we
showed in another article (Grynszpan et al., in press), that high
functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD) is associated
with alterations in the self-monitoring of gaze and judgment of
agency. Additionally, we found that the gaze-contingent viewing
window induced gaze behaviors for which social disambiguat-
ing scores on the task were linked to the time participants with
HFASD spent looking at the virtual characters’ faces. Thus, train-
ing based on our platform could conceivably be used to foster
relevant visual explorations of faces during social interactions in
individuals with HFASD. Further research on social gaze con-
trol may eventually generate new knowledge regarding these
disorders, which in turn could be used to enhance treatment
approaches.
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